From yesterday’s Second Circuit decision in Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski, decided by Judge Eunice Lee, joined by Judges Gerard Lynch and Beth Robinson:
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellee Basel Soukaneh, would permit a reasonable jury to find that in the course of a routine traffic stop, [Nicholas Andrzejewski, a Waterbury, Connecticut police officer] unlawfully and violently handcuffed and detained Soukaneh in the back of a police vehicle for over half an hour and conducted a warrantless search of Soukaneh’s vehicle after Soukaneh presented a facially valid firearms permit and disclosed that he possessed a firearm pursuant to the permit. On appeal, Andrzejewski argues that we should reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity because the presence of the lawfully owned firearm in the vehicle gave him the requisite probable cause to detain Soukaneh, search the interior of his car, and search his trunk….
Andrzejewski argues that … his actions … were justified because he had both “a reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity” and “probable cause to detain [Soukaneh] and search his person and his vehicle” once he was made aware of the presence of a gun in the vehicle—even absent any articulable basis to question the permit’s validity….
The desire to confirm the legitimacy of the facially valid firearms permit that Soukaneh presented did not—with nothing more—provide Andrzejewski with probable cause for the half-hour or longer handcuffed detention that occurred. It is uncontested that Soukaneh presented Andrzejewski with a gun license, the legitimacy of which Andrzejewski himself admits he had no reason to question. Moreover, Andrzejewski concedes that he was informed of the facially valid license before Soukaneh told him that he had a gun and specified its location.
Andrzejewski does not allege that the permit appeared abnormal in any fashion or that Soukaneh engaged in any suspicious or threatening behavior. On the facts before us, Andrzejewski does not provide an articulable reason why he, or any other reasonable officer, could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Soukaneh possessed his firearm unlawfully in violation of Section 29-38(a). To find otherwise would consign those validly carrying firearms pursuant to a license to automatic detention because it would effectively presume that gun permits are invalid until proven valid, or that lawfully owned guns are per se contraband until proven otherwise. Such a finding would effectively render armed individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights meaningless when they are lawfully carrying firearms.
{The potential effect of Andrzejewski’s argument on the rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment is worth noting, notwithstanding that those rights are not in dispute for purposes of this appeal. While not every lawful possession of a firearm will trigger Second Amendment protection, some will. Regardless of whether the Second Amendment applies, however, individuals lawfully possessing a weapon should not be penalized by having a diminishment of their Fourth Amendment rights.} …
We [also] conclude that the ubiquity of Fourth Amendment protections established in the plethora of traffic stop cases put Andrzejewski on notice of the protected rights at issue during his de facto arrest of Soukaneh in the absence of probable cause. We have made clear that “a constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause, as well as a constitutional right to be free from unreasonably prolonged or intrusive investigative detention” are themselves the clearly established rights that justify the denial of qualified immunity….
This is not a close case, about which reasonable officers could differ. The law as it stood at the time of the events in question left no doubt that a person in possession of a firearm and a facially valid permit for that firearm had a clearly established right to be free from the kind of forcible and prolonged detention to which Soukaneh was subjected, absent any objective reason to suspect that the permit was forged or otherwise invalid…. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court to deny Andrzejewski’s motion for summary judgment and decline to find that Andrzejewski has qualified immunity as to his detention of Soukaneh….
In addition to being necessary for Soukaneh’s de facto arrest, probable cause was also needed for the warrantless searches of his car. As discussed above, no such probable cause existed. However, another inquiry for determining the lawfulness of a vehicle search during a traffic stop is whether an officer had a reasonable apprehension of danger—which may permit a Terry frisk of the automobile…. [Still,] the presence of a lawful weapon alone does not automatically make someone suspicious, nor a situation dangerous, such as would justify the Terry frisk of a car….
Andrzejewski attempts to justify the search of the trunk by arguing that the recovery of Soukaneh’s lawful gun provided probable cause to search the trunk for other guns under the automobile exception…. Andrzejewski argues that once he retrieved the gun identified by Soukaneh in the driver’s side door compartment, he had the requisite probable cause to search the trunk for contraband. But the presence or retrieval of the lawful firearm could not, and did not, provide probable cause to search for contraband in the trunk, absent indicators of criminal activity. Andrzejewski attempts to justify his actions by relying on cases in which the discovery of contraband (e.g., the discovery of drugs) provided a foundation for probable cause for a warrantless search under the automobile exception. But a lawfully owned gun is not per se contraband. Andrzejewski provides no other basis for suspicion that the trunk contained illegal weapons, or any evidence to suggest a crime was afoot to justify his separate intrusion into the trunk…. Andrzejewski’s warrantless searches of Soukaneh’s car and trunk violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches….
John R. Williams represents Soukaneh.
