Bosses at the firms linked to the deadly Grenfell Tower refurbishment have continued to rake in hundreds of millions of pounds in the years since the inferno.
The inquiry into the disaster has laid bare a toxic corporate culture in both the construction trade and the industry that produced the flammable materials used on Grenfell’s facade.
In particular, a huge tranche of emails and messages disclosed to the inquiry showed employees at one of the key firms actively misleading customers about the safety of building materials, and construction companies displaying a cavalier attitude to fire safety.
The president of Arconic – which manufactured the flammable cladding panels blamed by the inquiry for accelerating the blaze – accepted during his evidence that staff had ‘misled’ and ‘lied’ to customers about the resistance of its products to fire.
Yet despite their appalling role in causing the tragedy which claimed 72 lives, it was revealed earlier this year that 10 individuals at the top of the building material manufacturing firms had banked more than £300million since the fire in June 2017.
They include one director who drives an Aston Martin with a James Bond-inspired number plate and another executive who bought a €7.5million seafront mansion the year after the tragedy.
Among the bosses at firms linked to the Grenfell Tower refurbishment are (top row, left to right) Robert Bond, Gene Murtagh and Eugene Murtagh and (bottom row, left to right) Pierre-André de Chalendar, Benotit Bazin and Ray Bailey
Kingspan chief executive Gene Murtagh (pictured), whose firm manufactured combustible insulation which was used on Grenfell Tower, has reportedly made £26million since the blaze
Mr Murtagh bought a seafront property in Dublin for an estimated £6.8million the next year
Rydon was the lead contractor for a distrastrous £10million renovation of Grenfell Tower ahead of the fire – the firm’s owner was owner Robert Bond (pictured with his wife)
Robert Bond’s home in Orpington is pictured – he has been owner of Rydon since 2006
Ahuge tranche of emails and messages disclosed to the inquiry showed employees at one of the key firms actively misleading customers about the safety of building materials, and construction companies displaying a cavalier attitude to fire safety
The Grenfell Tower blaze on June 14 2017 killed 2017 people – a new report published today by inquiry chairman Sir Michael Moore-Bick found all their deaths were avoidable
Arconic
The cladding panels put on the exterior face of Grenfell Tower during a refurbishment were manufactured by Arconic, a French company.
They were Reynobond aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with a highly flammable polyethylene (PE) core.
In his first report for the public inquiry, chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick concluded the cladding panels were the ‘principle reason’ why flames shot up the side of the 24-storey block.
He said the flammable core of the panels ‘acted as a source of fuel’ as the inferno raged out of control in a matter of minutes.
Yet this grave fire safety risk was not a surprise to Arconic.
The inquiry heard that Arconic sought to sell its more flammable products – such as the Reynobond PE panels – to the UK when they were restricted in other countries.
Arconic had known for years that its PE products could be dangerous due to the combustibility of the material at its core.
The PE panels passed fire rating tests in 2005 when bolted to a building, but failed when bent to hang from a wall. Arconic did not reveal details of the failed test, conducted in France, when it sought – and obtained – a certificate from the British Board of Agrément (BBA) for its cladding in 2008.
Internal emails about the failed fire test were damning. Claude Wehrle, Arconic’s technical manager, wrote in 2010 that it was ‘hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’.
Claude Schmidt, president of Arconic, gave evidence to the inquiry in Feb 2021 after refusing to be a witness for seven months.
Asked whether he accepted that the email showed Arconic were misleading customers with its marketing about fire safety, Mr Schmidt told the inquiry he did. He also accepted another executive had lied when he told a client about the fire performance of one product.
Other executives at Arconic refused to give evidence altogether.
In his damning final report, released today, Sir Martin said Arconic ‘deliberately concealed’ from the market the true extent of the danger of using Reynobond 55 PE – aluminium panels containing a plastic filling, that were repeatedly used by councils due to its relatively low cost.
A long-awaited second report into the deaths of 72 people in a fire at Grenfell Tower has today been published more than seven years after the blaze
Claude Schmidt, president of the multinational corporation Arconic’s French arm, told the Grenfell inquiry he accepted the firm misled customers with its marketing about fire safety
Sir Martin Moore-Bick, the judge leading the Grenfell Inquiry, said in his first report the cladding panels manufactured by Arconic were the ‘principle reason’ why flames shot up the side of the 24-storey towerblock
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard that Arconic’s cladding panels – polyethylene (PE) panels – formed the system used at the tower in North Kensington and have been blamed for the rapid spread of the fire (pictured)
The inquiry found Arconic was ‘determined to exploit what it saw as weak regulatory regimes’ in the UK by continuing to sell this product, despite knowing it performed much worse in a fire than a superior, modified version it also manufactured.
Instead, it allowed customers in the UK to continue buying the unmodified version, and failed to pass on the information about its performance.
Sir Martin said: ‘That was not an oversight. It reflected a deliberate strategy to continue selling Reynobond 55 PE in the UK, based on a statement about its fire performance it knew to be false.’
But Arconic was revealed this year to have recouped almost all their legal expenses relating to Grenfell from their insurers, according to their accounts.
An analysis of Arconic’s account by The Times revealed bosses had profited from Arconic’s sale to a hedge fund last year.
Tim Myers, chief executive of Arconic from 2020 to 2023, cashed in shares of £22.3million on top of £23.9million in pay since Grenfell. Its chief financial officer Erick Asmussen and chief commercial officer Mark Vrablec made a further £9.2million from share sales plus £9.2million in pay, bringing the trio’s total to almost £65million.
Arconic said in a statement at the time that its cladding had been used worldwide and test results had been widely available.
The firm today said: ‘The fire was a terrible tragedy and as Arconic remembers the 72 people who died, our thoughts remain with the families, friends and all of those affected.
‘AAP was a core participant in the Inquiry and has acknowledged its role as one of the material suppliers involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.
‘The company respects the Inquiry process. AAP cooperated fully with the work of the Inquiry and will continue to engage with further legal processes.
‘Together with other parties, AAP has made financial contributions to settlements for those affected, as well as to the restorative justice fund.’
Arconic added that they ‘reject any claim that AAP sold an unsafe product’ and insisted they ‘did not conceal information from or mislead any certification body, customer, or the public’.
Celotex
Celotex, owned by the French giant Saint-Gobain, was responsible for the insulation panels that were installed over most of the tower’s external facade during the refurbishment. The rest was provided by Irish manufacturer Kingspan.
Since the fire, Saint-Gobain has paid its chief executive Pierre-André de Chalendar £11.7million, while Benoit Bazin, his successor since 2021, has earned £15.8million, according to The Times.
Mr de Chalendar has been chairman and CEO of Celotex’s parent company since 2010, while Mr Bazin has been at Saint-Gobin in various roles since 1999 and was senior vice president at the time of the fire.
The inquiry found that the panels installed at Grenfell released toxic gas including hydrogen cyanide as it burnt.
The company had initially struggled to get its material to pass fire safety tests.
One email from 2013 found an employee wondering: ‘Do we take the view that our product realistically shouldn’t be used behind most cladding panels because in the event of a fire it would burn?’
Jamie Hayes, a former technical services officer at Celotex, told the inquiry he came up with a plan to boost the chances of the RS500 insulation boards passing fire tests in 2014 by adding fire-resistant boards to a test rig. He denied, however, knowing that Celotex would conceal this detail in its official report and subsequent marketing material.
It was, he said, ‘a failure of moral fibre’ that stopped him challenging the company when he eventually became aware.
Since the fire, Saint-Gobain has paid its chairman Pierre-André de Chalendar £11.7million, the Times reported – he is pictured at a general meeting in Paris in June 2018
Benoit Bazin is pictured in October 2021, in the year he became Saint-Gobain’s CEO
Composite photograph showing how fire swept through Grenfell Tower in west London in 2017
Sir Martin said in his final report that the British-based company manipulated fire tests to make it erroneously appear as though its insulation boards were safe for use on Grenfell Tower. They were not.
He said Celotex ’embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market.’
In May 2014, and with the ‘complicity’ of industry organisation the Building Research Establishment (BRE), Celotex tested a system that contained two sets of fire-resistant magnesium oxide boards placed in critical positions to ensure that it passed.
Celotex then obtained from the BRE a test report that ‘omitted any reference to the magnesium oxide boards’, thereby rendering it materially incomplete and misleading, Sir Martin found.
He said Celotex then marketed the product incorrectly, and said it was acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height.
Celotex deliberately tucked the information about the test away ‘in the small print of its marketing literature’.
It was subsequently presented to cladding specialists Harley – who were involved in the renovation of Grenfell – as suitable and safe for use.
Celotex said at the time that it did not design or fit any cladding systems – in other words, the combination of cladding and insulation, among other materials, that formed the external facade – including at Grenfell. It said its own review found ‘unacceptable behaviour’, but six employees had since left and controls had been tightened.
In its response to today’s findings, the firm said it had ‘reviewed and improved process controls, quality management and the approach to marketing within the Celotex business to meet industry best practice’.
Kingspan
The Irish firm’s insulation product was a component of the tower block’s external renovation.
But tests performed in 2007 and 2008 on systems incorporating the then current form of its K15 product were ‘disastrous’.
Regardless, Kingspan did not withdraw the product from the market, despite its own concerns about its fire performance.
In the seven years since flames engulfed Grenfell Tower, Kingspan’s billionaire founder Eugene Murtagh has banked £149.3million from share sales (£80.7million), dividends (£68.1 million) and pay (£540,000), according to The Times. He stepped down as chairman in 2021.
It was reported that his son Gene Murtagh, the group’s chief executive since 2005, made £26million — including from a £3million block of shares sold just before damaging fire test evidence emerged at the Grenfell Inquiry.
A year after the disaster, Gene Murtagh bought a €7.5million seafront mansion in Dalkey, Dublin, according to the newspaper.
The inquiry heard that when a facade engineering firm, Wintech, questioned if Kingspan’s insulation was suitable for high-rise buildings, Philip Heath, a technical manager, wrote in an email to colleagues: ‘Wintech can go f*** themselves and if they are not careful we will sue the a— [off] them.’
In a harrowing text exchange, Arron Chalmers, technical project leader at Kingspan, joked with a colleague about K15 being marketed as safe when it failed fire tests. ‘All we do is lie in here,’ one message read.
Kingspan’s billionaire founder Eugene Murtagh (pictured) is reported to have banked £149.3million in the seven years since flames engulfed Grenfell Tower
His son Gene Murtagh (pictured) reportedly received £26million since becoming CEO in 2005
Gene Murtagh, pictured with his wife Orla, is the CEO of Kingspan, who sold the insulation which was used in Grenfell Tower
A report in 2019, from the first phase of the inquiry, concluded the tower’s cladding did not comply with building regulations
Phillip Heath sent messages saying he didn’t ‘give a damn’ about concerns over insulation and said a contractor firm could ‘go f*** itself’
Phillip Heath, Kingspan’s technical manager, sent this after contractors raised concerns in 2008 (spelling mistakes sic)
Sir Martin said Kingspan ‘knowingly’ claimed – incorrectly – that its insulation could be used on buildings over 18 metres in height, regardless of design or other components.
He said Kingspan successfully obtained a certificate from the industry body Local Authority Building Control (LABC) that backed up those false claims – and relied on that endorsement to sell that product for ‘many years’.
He said: ‘Kingspan cynically exploited the industry’s lack of detailed knowledge about (its products) and relied on the fact that an unsuspecting market was very likely to rely on its own claims about the product.
Kingspan denies liability for the disaster, saying the insulation was only used on five per cent of Grenfell Tower, in a non-compliant system without the company’s knowledge.
Responding to the report, Kingspan said it had ‘long acknowledged the wholly unacceptable historical failings that occurred in part of our UK insulation business’ but said these were ‘in no way reflective of how we conduct ourselves as a group, then or now’.
It said it remained ‘committed to playing a leading role in providing safe and sustainable building solutions, including continuing to work with government and industry partners’.
Rydon
Rydon was the lead contractor for the distrastrous £10million renovation, having been brought in as a cheaper alternative to the original contractor Leadbitter.
In 2020, it was found that Rydon had seen its profits rise by 60 per cent in two years.
Rydon’s best-paid director Robert Bond, owner since 2006, was said at the time to have enjoyed a salary increase of 12 per cent to £473,000 over the same period.
Mr Bond lives in a £3million mansion on a private estate in south-east London and drives an Aston Martin with a ‘Bond’ number plate. Facebook pictures show the Bonds holidaying on a yacht and posing in front of a Ferrari.
Following its role in the Grenfell tragedy, Rydon was later blocked from the Government’s help-to-buy scheme.
In 2021, it divested its contracting operations to a new business, Real. This collapsed into administration in late 2023 owing over millions of pounds.
Time and again, saving money had appeared to inform decisions. The inquiry heard that Rydon decided to cut costs by switching the cladding from the original zinc option to ACM.
Cladding contractor Harley Facades told Rydon the switch could make savings of £419,627 or £576,973, depending on the type of fixing used.
But this is not what Rydon would tell the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) which was responsible for the building and the refurbishment.
Instead, it said the savings would be £293,368 or £376,175, when it presented the plans.
Rydon boss Robert Bond is seen dressed as a clown, in a photo shared by his wife on Facebook
Mr Bond lives in a £3million mansion on a private estate in south-east London and drives an Aston Martin with a ‘Bond’ number plate (pictured)
Tributes to Grenfell victims were penned on a sign placed on hoardings around the tower
The 72 victims of the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017 are pictured as follows – (top row left to right) Mohammad Al-Haj Ali, Ya-Haddy Sisi Saye, also known as Khadija Saye, Anthony Disson, Khadija Khalloufi, Mary Mendy, Isaac Paulos, Sheila, Gloria Trevisan, Marco Gottardi, (second row left to right) Berkti Haftom, Ali Yarwar Jafari, Majorie Vital, Yahya Hashim, Hamid Kani, Jessica Urbano Ramirez, Zainab Deen, Nura Jemal, Jeremiah Deen, (third row left to right) Yasin El-Wahabi, Firdaws Hashim, Hashim Kedir, Debbie Lamprell, Ernie Vital, Sakina Afrasehabi, Denis Mur-phy, Raymond ‘Moses’ Bernard, Biruk Haftom, (fouth row left to right) Yaqub Hashim, Mehdi El-Wahabi, Ligaya Moore, Nur Huda El-Wahabi, Victoria King, Mo-hammed Amied Neda, Maria del Pilar Burton, Hesham Rahman, Gary Maunders, (fifth row left to right) Alexandra Atala, Vincent Chiejina, Steve Power, Rania Ibrahim, Fethia Hassan, Hania Hassan, Fathia Ahmed Elsanousi, Abufras Ibrahim (silhouette), Isra Ibrahim (silhouette), (sixth row left to right) Mariem Elgwahry, Eslah Elgwahry (silhouette), Mohamednur Tuccu, Amal Ahmedin, Amaya Tuccu-Ahmedin, Amna Mahmud Idris, Abdeslam Sebbar (silhouette) , Joseph Daniels (silhouette), Logan Gomes, (seventh row left to right) Omar Belkadi, Farah Hamdan, Malak Belkadi (sil-houette), Leena Belkadi (silhouette), Abdulaziz El-Wahabi, Faouzia El-Wahabi, Fatemeh Afrasiabi, Kamru Miah, Rabeya Begum, (eighth row left to right) Mohammed Hamid, Mohammed Hanif, Husna Begum, Bassem Choukair, Nadia Choucair, Mierna Choucair, Fatima Choucair, Zainab Choucair and Sirria Choucair
Asked about the discrepancy, Simon Lawrence, contracts manager at Rydon, told the inquiry: ‘I would suggest by that, although not my area of expertise, that Rydon took some of the saving for themselves.’
An email from Zak Maynard, Rydon’s commercial manager, in 2014, was more blunt.
‘We are quids in!!’, Maynard wrote, although he would later tell the inquiry he was ‘joking’.
Sir Martin said in his final report that Rydon was as culpable as the manufacturers because of its ‘casual attitude’ throughout the project, and because it gave ‘inadequate thought to fire safety’.
Sir Martin said its systems for managing the design work ‘did not ensure that its subcontractors and consultants properly understood their different responsibilities’.
And he said Kent-based Rydon did not understand where responsibility for individual decisions lay and as a result it failed to coordinate the design work properly.
He said Rydon ‘failed to take proper steps to investigate (sub contractor) Harley’s competence and ensure that it was competent to undertake the work and capable of providing the services required of it’.
He said it was complacent about the need for fire engineering advice.
Earlier this year, The Guardian revealed that ‘life critical’ fire safety issues had been found in 56 per cent of blocks built by the development arm of Rydon.
Rydon told the inquiry it had ‘relied on others’ to ensure the cladding system at Grenfell complied with building regulations on fire safety.
Harley Facades
Harley Facades acted as cladding contractor for the refurbishment.
The designers of the cladding system were clearly aware of the potential of fire spread on the outside of the building, according to documents disclosed to the inquiry.
An email exchanged between two senior employees of Harley Facades in March 2015 showed manager Daniel Anketell-Jones, discussing ‘fire stopping’ measures in relation to the ACM panels with Ray Bailey, a director, whose 25-year-old son had been appointed as Harley Facades’s project manager despite having little experience.
Mr Anketell-Jones said: ‘There is no point in ‘fire stopping’, as we all know; the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire! The whole point is to stop ‘unseen’ fire spreading in the cavity.’
Two years later, the flames escaped out of the fourth floor window, ignited the cladding and the 24-storey building was rapidly engulfed in fire.
Sir Martin’s final report said Harley Facades ‘failed in many respects to meet the standards’ expected of it.
He said the firm ‘did not concern itself sufficiently with fire safety at any stage of the refurbishment’.
Ray Bailey, a director at Harley Facades, is seen at the inquiry in September 2020 – his 25-year-old son had been appointed as the firm’s project manager despite having little experience
Ray Bailey is seen giving evidence at the Grenfell inquiry – his firm Harley Facades acted as cladding contractor for a refurbishment of the tower in the years before the 2017 blaze
Former Harley Facades design manager Daniel Anketell-Jones is seen here giving evidence to the Grenfell Tower inquiry in Paddington, west London, in September 2020
Today’s second Grenfell Inquiry report covers the actions of corporate firms in the construction industry, the local authority, London Fire Brigade and government
He said it, too, ‘bears a significant degree of responsibility for the fire’.
Ray Bailey told the inquiry he did not know the material could burn and accused the producers of the combustible insulation of ‘misleading his firm’.
At the time of the fire in 2017, Mr Bailey and his company secretary wife Belinda lived in a grand house worth around £1million in Crowborough, East Sussex, where a Porsche and a Land Rover were seen parked in the drive.
Mother-of-three Mrs Bailey’s Facebook profile shows her sitting next to a tiger on an exotic holiday and enjoying luxurious ski trips.
